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1. Introduction 
 
The economic crisis in the Euro area continues to galvanise its member states’ governments in 
2011. In particular, Greece and increasingly other countries in the so-called periphery of the 
monetary union are facing the threat of defaulting on their debt. 
 
Over and above the pressing default problem, which is exacerbated by the lack of country-
level exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy, Euro area governments need to achieve 
the longer-term macroeconomic stability required for a functioning monetary union. This sta-
bility, which includes the reduction of external imbalances, is widely recognised as essential 
for the Euro area to achieve robust growth. Without growth it is feared that unemployment 
cannot be reduced, foreboding more social unrest and possibly threatening the very project of 
European integration. 
 
In striving for stability, Euro area governments therefore face two challenges: the reduction of 
public deficits, and the reduction of external imbalances. However, while the public deficits 
are in the limelight ever since the inception of the monetary union, the focus on external im-
balances has been meagre. While the present crisis has finally alerted some European policy 
makers, the governments still largely ignore the importance of reducing current account im-
balances in a coordinated manner. This is evident in their latest version of national Stability 
Programmes (SPs) from April 2011.
†
 If these SPs roughly reflect both perceptions about eco-
nomic developments and intended policies in European governments, then their analysis helps 
evaluating whether the Euro area is on track to stability and, thereby, finding its way out of 
the crisis. 
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 SPs project macroeconomic developments and government plans for achieving stability over the 
next four years. The April 2011 version of the SPs, on which this paper focuses, makes forecasts for 
2011-2014. They are submitted annually by each member government to the European Commission. 
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2 
In this paper, we argue that the projections for achieving stability in the current SPs are very 
likely too optimistic.
‡
 We aver that by ignoring the importance of external rebalancing and 
assuming an overly buoyant world economy, the SPs either forecast unrealistic growth rates 
or unrealistically successful fiscal consolidation. Towards this, we examine the interrelated-
ness of public deficit reduction and external imbalances reduction. We derive our argument 
mainly from evaluating the SPs against the logic of simple accounting identities, which clarify 
the connections of financial balances and thereby of the two challenges. Thus we transcend 
the SPs’ narrow focus only on the government balance, and shed light instead on the SPs’ 
projections of the financial balances of all three sectors in the economy (foreign, private and 
public) and how they are intertwined with the overall macroeconomic development. Merely 
the final brief sketch of feasible alternative policy recommendations to address both challeng-
es (sustainability of public deficits and current account positions) requires a greater sophisti-
cation of the economic argument and thus involves more judgment.  
 
The paper is subdivided into eight short Sections. In the next one, we discuss the relevance of 
the public deficit and external imbalances in the European context. In Section 3, we recall the 
accounting relationships of the three financial balances. Section 4 discusses the related notion 
of the “sustainability” of government, private and foreign sector financial balances, conclud-
ing that one balance being “sustainable”, is contingent on the other two balances being “sus-
tainable”, too. Section 5 analyses financial balances in the Euro area from 1999 until 2010. 
Section 6 considers the SPs’ forecast of macroeconomic and balance development until 2014.  
We find that, individually, the SPs rely on optimistic assumptions about GDP growth; collec-
tively, they require an improvement of the Euro area’s current account with the rest of the 
world, the continuation of significant current account imbalances within the Euro area, and a 
steep drop of private balances in some countries. Section 7 simulates three scenarios with less 
optimistic but, in our view, plausible assumptions to adumbrate how the SP projections about 
balances (and growth contributions) would fare in such a case. The scenarios differ mainly in 
which countries have to bear the adjustment burden. Our results show that either deficit coun-
tries would find it impossible to realise their rebalancing plans; or that surplus countries 
would have to acquiesce into increasing their public spending, since rebalancing on their side 
would require greater domestic activity to uphold growth. Section 8 concludes that failure to 
consider external imbalances is likely to entrench existing instability in the Euro area and to 
                                                 
‡
 A similar argument for the stability programmes of the previous reporting period can be found in 
Brecht et al. (2010). The present contribution is a shortened version of our more comprehensive anal-
ysis of this year’s SPs (Semieniuk et al. 2011).  
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lead to long-lasting economic stagnation. Further we conclude that a symmetric effort at re-
balancing current accounts would slow down fiscal consolidation (in the current account sur-
plus countries) but would be one important aspect of addressing both macroeconomic chal-
lenges. It would help achieve fiscal consolidation in the medium term and the desired stabil-
ity.  
 
2. Two possible measures of monetary union stability: fiscal consolidation and external 
balancing 
 
Functioning monetary unions require a degree of homogeneity within member economies. In 
the European context, the aim to establish or maintain this homogeneity is usually subsumed 
under the codeword “stability”. Hitherto, creating stability was associated with reducing pub-
lic deficits and public debt-to-GDP ratios. This is enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). Recently, however, calls have been heard to also address external imbalances, that is, 
very positive and negative current account balances. 
 
2.1 Reducing public deficits  
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for the Eurozone countries allows for government defi-
cits of no more than 3 per cent of GDP. Failure to comply may result in sanctions. Yet, in 
2010 this limit was breached by all member countries save Estonia, Finland and Luxembourg. 
Greece, Portugal and Spain even reported a public deficit of more than 9 per cent of GDP, 
France ran a deficit of 7 per cent. Ireland topped the list with a 32 per cent deficit, owing to 
large bank bail-outs. The Euro area average measured 6.8 per cent of GDP (see Table 1), dete-
riorating 0.4 percentage points from 2009. The Council of the European Union has stipulated 
time frames ranging from 2011 for Malta to 2015 for Ireland to return below the 3 per cent 
threshold. 
 
Furthermore, the SGP demands that the debt-to-GDP ratio not surpass 60 per cent.
§
 Actual 
debt levels were never below that mark in Belgium, Greece and Italy. Moreover, the lowest 
debt-to-GDP level for the Euro area as a whole never dipped below 66 per cent of GDP ever 
since the inception of the Euro in 1999. Due to large government deficits and guarantees no-
tably for financial institutions at risk of default, debt levels across member countries surged 
                                                 
§
 Given a government deficit of 3 per cent and nominal GDP growth of 5 per cent every year, the pub-
lic debt-to-GDP ratio converges to 60 per cent in the long run. 
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further during the crisis. In 2010 the Euro area’s average public debt level had increased by 
almost 20 percentage points to 85.4 per cent of GDP. In addition, the current solvency crisis 
gave a boost to demands to make the SGP’s threat of sanctions credible; and to require coun-
tries to keep their government budget close to balance or in surplus over the medium term.  
Germany already created such a mechanism independently. The constitution was amended by 
the “debt brake” law in 2009. It states that the “structural” deficit of the federal government 
must not exceed 0.35 per cent from 2016 onwards. On the regional plane, governments will 
even face sanctions if they incur any “structural” deficit in or after 2020.  
 
2.2 Reducing current account imbalances  
The global imbalances characterised by large current account deficits and surpluses are wide-
ly held to be one of the major macroeconomic distortions that fuelled the global economic 
crisis starting in 2008. Many economists argue that the reduction in global imbalances is a 
central prerequisite for a global recovery and for the stabilisation of the world economy more 
generally (e.g. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2009; Horn et al. 2009; IMF 2009).  
 
As a matter of fact, many sizeable economies had current accounts significantly different 
from zero in 2007: the US deficit stood at 5.2 per cent of GDP, the UK’s at 2.6 per cent, Spain 
ran a 10 per cent current account deficit. Conversely, China, Germany and Japan displayed 
surpluses of 11, 7.9 and 5.8 per cent of GDP respectively. 
 
Meanwhile, the Euro area as a whole sustained a relatively balanced current account with the 
rest of the world since its creation in 1999. Yet, within the monetary union, individual coun-
tries display both large surpluses and deficits: Germany’s 5.8 per cent were topped by the 
Netherlands’ surplus of 8.4 per cent of national GDP by 2007. On the flipside, Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain ran current account deficits of more than 10 per cent of GDP by 2007. These 
imbalances are particularly vicious in a monetary union: while in the early stages, credit was 
available at attractive interest rates, the resulting foreign indebtedness in combination with the 
inability to adjust exchange rates is now a formidable obstacle to these countries servicing 
their debt on financial markets. 
 
While the SGP does not address such imbalances, it is now being recognised that a reform of 
this pact should include avoiding “excessive imbalances”, in particular divergences in current 
account positions. This has been argued by the so-called Van Rompuy task force and has been 
This is the submitted version of a chapter published by Edward Elgar in Jespersen, Jesper and Madsen, Mogens, 
(eds.), Keynes’s General Theory for Today pp. 186-206 in 2012: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781781009512.xml  
Submitted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24059/  
 
5 
incorporated into the European Commission’s proposals for a reform of the SGP (van 
Rompuy 2010; see Hacker and van Treeck 2010 for a discussion). However, it is not yet re-
flected in the SPs as will become clear in what follows.  
 
3. Financial balances: a quick reminder 
 
3.1 The three financial balances 
Before analysing the SPs with respect to reducing public deficits and external imbalances, we 
introduce the accounting relationships of public, private and foreign financial balances.
**
 The-
se will inform our analysis.
††
 The following accounting identity holds: 
 
(1)  Public sector financial balance + Private sector financial balance + Financial balance 
of the foreign sector ≡ 0. 
 
Hence, any particular sector in the economy can only run a surplus, if it is offset by a deficit 
of equal magnitude in the remaining two sectors of the economy. For the foreign balance, it 
moreover holds that if one country runs a current account surplus, then at least in one other 
country the government or the private sector has to sustain a financing deficit.  
 
3.2 GDP and Balances 
Given certain assumptions, the (projected) evolution of the financial balances of the three 
sectors also has implications for the (projected) growth contributions of the different compo-
nents of GDP (see Appendix for a more detailed discussion). In order to elucidate the link 
between the composition of GDP and the sectoral financial balances, recall that: 
 
(2) GDP ≡ C + I + G + X – M,  
 
where C = private consumption, I = private investment, G  = government expenditures in final 
goods, X = exports, M = imports.  
 
                                                 
**
 The balances are annual flow variables. The public financial balance is the negative of the govern-
ment deficit. The foreign financial balance is the negative of the current account. The private financial 
balance is net savings of households and firms. 
††
 See Godley et al. (2008) and Hatzius (2003) for more detailed expositions of the financial balances 
approach.  
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Also recall that  
 
(3) GNI ≡ GDP + NIA, 
 
where GNI = gross national income, NIA = Net income and current transfers received from 
abroad. 
 
Gross national income will be used to derive consumption, saving (S) and tax payments to the 
government net of government transfer payments and subsidies (NT).  
 
(4) GNI ≡ C + S + NT, 
 
It follows from (3) and (4) that 
 
(5) (NT – G) + (S – I) + [(M – X) – NIA] ≡ 0, 
 
where (NT – G), (S – I), and [(M – X) – NIA] are the financial balances of the public, private 
and foreign sectors, respectively. Hence, changes in any of the components of GDP also im-
pinge on the balances. 
 
3.3 Desired and actual balances 
Ex post, the financial balances of the three sectors must sum to zero. Clearly, any particular 
sector will only be able to adjust its financial balance in the desired way, if the other two sec-
tors wish to adjust their joint financial balance by the same amount in the opposite direction. 
If this is not the case, and the sum of the desired balances exceeds, or falls short of, zero, then 
GDP will adjust to bring the actual balances in accordance with each other.  
 
To illustrate, suppose a government desired to keep a balanced budget by cutting expenses. 
Then the ex post balances would still have to match. Given that foreign demand is insufficient 
to let government balance its budget, i.e. (X – M) < (S – I), then it is likely that government 
would be forced into deficit by automatic stabilisers. For the cost cutting would result in in-
voluntary unemployment. Private sector savings would also fall due to this. Thus, the actual 
balances would sum to zero but at a lower than the desired output level.  
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Since the onset of the current crisis in 2008, governments proactively sought to stabilise the 
economy and reduce unemployment by means of discretionary measures, thus increasing the 
public deficit and accommodating a desired surge in the private balance. Yet, over the medi-
um term such a policy may imply that the government deficit and the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio eventually increase to what many fear (and the SGP posits) to be “unsustainable” levels.  
 
4. When are financial balances “unsustainable”?  
 
While the SGP strictly defines allowed government spending to be maximally 3 per cent of 
GDP, there is no clear-cut economic definition of “unsustainable”. However, if one subscribes 
to the notion that public deficits can be too large and moreover recognises that current account 
balances cannot grow without bound, it automatically follows that there must be an upper 
limit to the extent to which the private sector can be allowed to run a surplus.  
 
One can furthermore conclude that not only private surpluses but also private deficits should 
be kept moderate: first, a large private deficit would increase the danger of a solvency crisis. 
Second, should such a solvency crisis set in, as seen in the subprime crisis, the government – 
through automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures – would subsequently incur large 
deficits.  These may suddenly be deemed “unsustainable” from the point of view of the SGP 
or the financial markets. This completes the argument: the government financial position can-
not be considered “sustainable” by itself, but only when simultaneously the private sector 
financial position is deemed “sustainable” as well. Intriguingly, the SPs do not address this 
issue of linked balances but focus on the public sector deficit only. Similarly, “the financial 
markets” seemed to consider the public finances of all Euro area member states “sustainable” 
between 1999 and 2008/9, but then suddenly changed their minds in view of rapidly rising 
public deficits and debt. The current account balance is a much more accurate ex ante indica-
tor of the sustainability of national debt, since it reflects the joint financing situation of the 
private and public sectors of the country in question. In conclusion, declaring the financial 
balance of any particular sector as “unsustainable” necessitates calling the balances of the two 
other sectors equally “unsustainable” – irrespective of how this term is defined. 
 
5. Financial balances and macroeconomic development in the Euro area, 1999-2010 
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Section 3.2 spells out the connection between financial balances and GDP. The macroeco-
nomic development in the Euro area until 2010 illustrates these connections. Average real 
growth contributions of private, public and foreign sectors from 1999-2007 varied across 
countries: countries with relatively strong private demand growth on average displayed lower, 
partly even negative private financial balances (e.g. Spain or Greece). From the accounting 
relationships we know that the private balance is (S – I), and high private demand growth, i.e., 
consumption and investment, would imply that saving (S) is low and investment (I) is high, 
depressing the balance. The evolution of public and private financial balances during the cri-
sis differed sharply from the preceding period. In 2007, government deficits were still below 3 
per cent in most countries, but the private sector ran large deficits especially in the “PIGS” 
countries
‡‡
, reflected in large current account deficits. When the private debt bubbles burst 
and the private sector suddenly increased its net savings in all Euro area countries, govern-
ment filled the gap as a consequence of rising unemployment and solvency problems in the 
private sector: the public balance fell and public deficits soared (see Table 1 for the 2010 bal-
ances).
§§
 
 
Moreover, the yields on 10-year government bonds indicate that financial markets deem pub-
lic debt-to-GDP ratios to have reached “unsustainable” levels in some countries. At the time 
of writing (July 2011), speculative pressures are focused on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Spain and Italy are increasingly threatened to be classified in this category, too. This devel-
opment highlights the interrelatedness of the financial balances: until shortly before the crisis, 
the public financial balance and the public debt-to-GDP ratio used to be significantly lower in 
Spain or Ireland than, for instance, in Germany. Those two countries fulfilled the SGP rules 
for “sound” government policy. Yet, in both countries public indebtedness has drastically 
increased during the past two years as a result of the sharp upward move in private financial 
balances (see footnote 7).  
 
6. Assumptions and implications of the national Stability Programmes for 2011-2014  
                                                 
‡‡
 It should be obvious from our analysis that we reject the one-sided blaming of the current account 
deficit countries as being responsible for the current euro crisis. We use this term here simply to re-
member that the projected current account surpluses by Germany and the Netherlands (and some 
other smaller member states) necessitate the existence of a certain number of “pigs” countries, i.e., 
countries with worryingly large current account deficits. 
§§
 As an example, in Ireland the public debt-to-GDP ratio was very low until recently, but it almost 
quadrupled between 2007 and 2010 as a result of the current crisis. Similarly, over the past two years, 
the Spanish government had to run very large deficits and substantially increase the public debt rela-
tive to GDP, after it had run surpluses for several years before (while the private sector had very high 
deficits during the real estate boom).  
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The SPs forecast the macroeconomic development until 2014. Based on assumptions about 
some variables such as growth in the rest of the world, they draw conclusions about Euro zone 
countries’ GDP growth and the ability of the public sectors to reduce their deficits as well as 
the current account. The projections in the SPs about public financial balances and current 
account balances allow us to determine the private financial balance as the residual. Because 
the SPs also provide data on projected GDP growth, we can express the financial balances in 
euros as well as in per cent of GDP. These projections create a system of equations with 3 * 
17 = 51 variables for each year. For 2014, it is depicted in Table 2. Each row sums to zero, 
satisfying the accounting identity in section 3. In the middle three columns, the bottom line 
sums to the respective Euro area balance. The foreign balance in that row is the financial bal-
ance of the Euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
 
Inspection of the projections for all SPs combined rather than only separately reveals three 
intriguing features. 
1.) Overall projected GDP growth rates appear quite optimistic, given the degree of fiscal 
consolidation: by the end of the projection period, private financial balances in the 
current account deficit countries would have worsened dramatically, in some cases by 
more than 5 or 6 percentage points (to -1.7 per cent of GDP in France, -2.7 per cent in 
Greece, -2.8 per cent in Italy, -1.1 per cent in Portugal and -0.3 per cent in Spain).
***
 If 
the private sector does not desire to reduce saving by as much, the adjustment process 
between a consolidating government and a cautious private sector will cause frictions 
in the economy and loss of growth. This relationship is frequently not explicitly dis-
cussed, but movement in the remaining balances is a necessary consequence of fiscal 
consolidation. The next two bullet points discuss whether it is likely that the foreign 
balance could act as a buffer. 
2.) Adding up the national current accounts in 2010 and 2014, the Euro area as a whole 
has to improve its current account position by 1.3 percentage points of GDP from 
2010 until 2014. This requires that exporters in the Euro area benefit from strong 
global demand, while imports grow less. It also runs contrary to efforts at global re-
balancing. Hence, if global rebalancing is nonetheless to take place and the large defi-
cit countries, in particular the U.S. and the UK, attempt to reduce their deficits, the 
                                                 
***
 The surplus countries forecast private net saving to fall but remain at high levels of 7.1 per cent in 
Austria, 4.5 per cent in Belgium, 6.5 per cent in Germany, and 11.2 per cent in the Netherlands. 
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SPs projections shift the surplus adjustment burden entirely on the other world’s large 
surplus countries, in particular China and Japan. 
3.) Despite the Euro area-wide upward trend in current accounts within the Euro area, cur-
rent accounts continue to diverge significantly in 2014. At first look, the improvement 
in current account of the “PIGS” countries looks promising. Greece, Portugal and 
Spain would rebalance but still run deficits of more than 2 per cent. Note, however, 
that part of this improvement in projections rests on the assumption of slow or even 
negative growth. The surplus countries Germany and Netherlands would augment 
their current account surpluses from roughly 5 to 6 and 8 to 10 per cent of GDP in the 
period 2010 to 2014. The only two countries that fare badly with their balances ac-
cording to the projections are Italy and France. Italy never reduces its current account 
deficit below 3 per cent while France’s actually steadily deteriorates to 3.6 per cent. 
This is all the more worrying as this might produce “new pigs”, but of an order of 
magnitude larger than the current ones. 
In short, the GDP growth projections and the fiscal consolidation may be jeopardised by non-
realisation of the optimistic assumptions about private sector’s ability to drive GDP growth 
and Euro area current account development.  
 
The contemplation of the private financial balance projection necessitates another word of 
caution: the deterioration of private financial balances in those countries, in which the in-
crease in private indebtedness has been also strong during the years prior to the financial cri-
sis, is remarkable. The deterioration would be triggered by renewed private demand booms, 
implying zero or even negative net private saving. The development of relatively good public 
balances with negative private balances was last witnessed in Ireland and Spain and flipped 
with the onset of the crisis. Against this backdrop, the implicit assumption about negative 
private financial balances for 2014 looks worrying, in particular for France, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal. 
 
7. Three alternative scenarios for the evolution of the Euro area current accounts 
 
Returning to the assumptions for the Euro area as a whole, we examine the sensitivity of the 
projections to a deterioration in one assumption. This seems justified by the assumptions’ 
optimistic nature. Moreover, it underscores our argument of the importance of heeding not 
only public deficits but also current account imbalances. In particular, we simulate what 
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would have to happen to the financial balances of all Euro area countries in 2014, if the Euro 
area failed to improve its current account vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The failure of Euro 
area current account improvement might happen for a number of reasons at the time of writ-
ing (see e.g. IMF 2011): growth may slow in China among fears of overheating and a hous-
ing-bubble, depressing world economic activity as a result; fears of a double-dip recession in 
the USA are substantiated by dismal economic data from the world’s largest economy and 
continuing partisan arguments about the speed of fiscal consolidation (deemed to slow by 
many) and the public debt ceiling (which many argue should be raised no further); volatile 
food and oil prices may also pose threats especially to emerging markets’ health; and financial 
market turbulences in Europe and elsewhere may further increase should current growth pro-
jections turn out to be overly optimistic. All of these threats make a strong case for the Euro 
area to develop a growth strategy that is less reliant on “the upturn in the volume of world 
trade” as optimistically projected in the German SP (2011: 8). 
 
We carry out three counterfactual exercises. In all of them, we assume that in 2014 the Euro 
area foreign financial balance (the negative of its current account) continues to be at 0.4 per 
cent of Euro area GDP instead of improving to -0.9 per cent. Further, we continue to take 
government deficits and GDP growth rates from the SPs’ projections. Thus we ensure compa-
rability with the SP baseline and can check whether the adjusted current accounts and growth 
contributions would let such growth rates and consolidation still appear plausible. The scenar-
ios differ merely by who bears the adjustment burden. In Scenario 1, the adjustment burden is 
borne by each deficit country proportional to its share of the 2010 Euro area gross deficit in 
2010. In the Scenario 2, the same takes place but the burden is distributed according to the 
projected deficit shares in 2014. This is to take heed of the governments’ belief about the per-
formance of their export industries. In Scenario 3, surplus countries share the adjustment bur-
den, which is distributed according to the size of their share of the surplus in 2010. Mean-
while, deficit countries reduce their deficit to at least 2 per cent of GDP. 
 
The results of the simulations are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 for the three scenarios respec-
tively. Obviously, the implications of Scenario 1 in Table 3 for the balances of the burden-
bearing deficit countries are devastating: In Greece and Portugal, private sector and current 
account deficits would once more soar to above 10 per cent of GDP. Italy and Spain would 
both run current account deficits of over 5 per cent and incur private deficits of respectively 
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almost 5 and over 3 per cent. Note that France’s current and private accounts do not budge 
much from their SP values: France projects a drastic deterioration of its balances anyhow. 
Scenario 2 shows the emergence of “new pigs” in Table 4: France and Italy would incur huge 
deficits and drastically reduce their private financial balances. 
 
Scenario 3 has Germany and the Netherlands starkly reduce their balances. Altogether the 
figures in Table 5 look not as outrageous. Yet, as Germany bears the lion’s share of the ad-
justment burden, its growth contribution from net exports is not a driver of GDP growth any 
more. Figure 1 shows the ramifications of the rebalancing simulation for Germany’s balances 
and sectoral growth contributions. The foreign sector’s steady growth contribution stems from 
our assumption that adjustment takes place in equal steps, i.e. every year one fourth of the 
entire current account deterioration is credited to Germany’s balance. Clearly, Germany 
would require even stronger private domestic demand (as government spending is taken over 
from the SP) than in the baseline. 2011 and 2012, in particular, would necessitate a veritable 
demand boom: Figure 1 shows the private growth contribution would be at almost 3 and 2.5 
percentage points. Historically, the private sector had much lower demand contributions. The 
average 1999-2007 was 0.7 percentage points! Thus, Scenario 3 clearly shows that growth 
would fall in Germany in case of adjustment of the current account, if government kept on its 
course for spending. 
 
Scenario 3 looks more stable than the other two scenarios, which would entirely undermine 
the project of stability in the Euro area. However, what would likely happen in the surplus 
economies is that the ex ante plans of both the public and foreign sectors to improve their re-
spective financial balances in the surplus countries would harm GDP growth, as Section 3.3 
details, unless the private sector desires to worsen its balance by an equivalent amount. 
 
The alternative to a collapse in growth rates would be for the government to willingly accept 
higher public deficits over an extended period of time. In such a scenario, it is clear from the 
analysis above that the German government may well have to accept deficits of significantly 
more than 3 per cent of GDP for several years, if the officially projected GDP growth rates 
and current account rebalancing are to be achieved within the Euro area. Although such a pol-
icy would currently be considered a breach of the “debt brake” rule, the deficit would still 
appear quite modest by international standards.  
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8. Concluding discussion 
 
This paper has evaluated whether the 2011 national Stability Programmes (SPs) of the Euro 
area countries are instrumental in achieving economic stability in the monetary union. In par-
ticular, we analysed how the SPs tackle the double challenge of public deficits and external 
imbalances. Our analysis rests, first, on the accounting identities of the public, private and 
foreign financial balances and, second, on the consideration of all SPs at once rather than sep-
arately. We found that conclusions are optimistic regarding GDP growth and fiscal consolida-
tion, while current account rebalancing is neglected. The SP conclusions are arrived at by 
assuming strong global export markets, entrenched current account imbalances within the 
monetary union as well as the deterioration of private financial balances in the current account 
deficit countries. By means of our simulations we conclude, on the one hand, that the failure 
of favourable global macroeconomic developments to materialise may lead to the opposite of 
the desired stability by exacerbating imbalances in the Euro area. On the other hand, given 
symmetric efforts at rebalancing, such exacerbation could be avoided.  If the rebalancing sur-
plus countries were to hold on to their fiscal consolidation strategy, however, growth rates are 
likely to fall. For Germany as a case in point we reason that maintaining forecast GDP growth 
would presuppose a private sector demand boom unprecedented in recent history. Admitting 
to the unlikelihood of such a boom, the only alternative way to achieve the GDP growth rates 
projected in the SPs by means of domestic economic activity would be higher government 
activity for Germany and the surplus countries in general. In terms of the financial balances 
this could be achieved by running higher deficits and thus a deterioration in the public sector 
balance; or by taxing away private sector savings and thus a deterioration in the private sector 
balance. 
 
Our approach to presenting our argument is overwhelmingly simple. Focussing on accounting 
identities we say little about economic theory that would explain the behaviour causing 
changes in desired financial balances or the adjustment process that leads to the ex post bal-
ance of zero. We do not attempt to explain how macroeconomic policies, unit labour cost dif-
ferentials, demographic factors, productivity growth differentials or financial market turbu-
lences etc. play a role in determining actual financial balances. For instance, we eschew a 
discussion in how far it is realistic to assume that Euro area countries with current account 
deficits would benefit from a reduction in the current account surpluses of Germany and other 
surplus countries (Scenario 3). While these questions merit closer attention, they would also 
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necessitate more assumptions than we deemed necessary for the purpose of this paper. Also, 
we admit to different conceptions of “unsustainable” balances. However, given our aim of 
elucidating the interrelatedness of financial balances in the Euro area context, it was beyond 
the scope of this article to address these more nuanced issues. And we could show that by 
focusing on the accounting identities, it can be revealed that the project of achieving the sta-
bility necessary for a functioning of a monetary union is jeopardised.  
 
Our counterfactual exercises involve several assumptions, which are appropriate to consider-
ing the approximate medium term effects of the change of current account adjustments, but 
may not appear realistic for every single year. This is in line with our aim to provide qualita-
tive conclusions about the direction in which Euro area economies are headed until 2014 ra-
ther than with estimating precise annual numbers.  
 
Subject to the qualification inherent in our approach, our straightforward calculations suggest 
that Euro area governments should not be surprised to see real macroeconomic developments 
diverge substantially from their SP projections. In particular, barring higher public deficits on 
the part of current account surplus and low debt-to-GDP ratio countries, a continued breach of 
the Euro area stability rules by countries with current account deficits is to be expected. In 
fact, realisation of the interrelatedness of the financial balances and sustained government 
deficits and aiming for symmetric rebalancing while accepting higher than 3 per cent public 
deficits in surplus countries may prove to be the only way to effectively stabilise the European 
Monetary Union without worsening the growth projections.  
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Figure 1: Simulated pattern of financial balances and GDP growth in Germany, 2010-2014 
from Scenario 3. 
a) Financial balances, in per cent of GDP 
  
b) Real growth contributions, in percentage points 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
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Table 1: Financial balances, Euro area countries, 2010. 
 
  
Balances as percentage of 
GDP   Balances in billions of Euro   Bal. as percentage of EMU GDP 
nom 
GDP 
  Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   
Austria -4.6 -3.2 7.8 Austria -13.2 -9.0 22.2 Austria -0.1 -0.1 0.2 284.0 
Belgium -4.1 -2.7 6.8 Belgium -14.4 -9.5 23.8 Belgium -0.2 -0.1 0.3 352.3 
Finland -2.5 -2.8 5.2 Finland -4.4 -5.0 9.4 Finland 0.0 -0.1 0.1 180.3 
France -7.0 3.5 3.6 France -136.5 67.3 69.2 France -1.5 0.7 0.8 1947.6 
Germany -3.3 -5.1 8.3 Germany -81.6 -126.6 208.2 Germany -0.9 -1.4 2.3 2498.8 
Greece -10.5 11.8 -1.3 Greece -24.2 27.1 -2.9 Greece -0.3 0.3 0.0 230.2 
Ireland -32.4 0.7 31.7 Ireland -49.9 1.1 48.8 Ireland -0.5 0.0 0.5 153.9 
Italy -4.6 4.2 0.4 Italy -71.2 65.0 6.2 Italy -0.8 0.7 0.1 1548.8 
Netherlands -5.4 -6.7 12.2 Netherlands -32.0 -39.9 71.9 Netherlands -0.3 -0.4 0.8 591.5 
Portugal -9.1 9.8 -0.7 Portugal -15.8 16.9 -1.1 Portugal -0.2 0.2 0.0 172.5 
Spain -9.2 4.5 4.7 Spain -98.2 48.0 50.2 Spain -1.1 0.5 0.5 1062.6 
Other EMU* -5.0 0.3 4.7 Other EMU* -9.1 0.5 8.6 Other EMU* 0.0 0.0 0.0 181.8 
Average -6.9 1.2 5.7 Sum -550.5 36.0 514.4 Average -6.0 0.39 5.6 9204.3 
* Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Note: The three balances may not sum to zero due to rounding.  
 
Source: AMECO**, authors’ calculations. 
 
** We analyse the SPs’ assumptions and conclusions based on May 2011 data from the European Commission’s Annual Macroeconomic 
(AMECO) database, which largely correspond to the data used for the SPs. 
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 Table 2: Financial balances, Euro area countries, 2014, according to the Stability Programmes. 
 
  
Balances as percentage of 
GDP   Balances in billions of Euro   Bal. as percentage of EMU GDP 
nom 
GDP 
  Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   
Austria -2.4 -4.7 7.1 Austria -8.0 -15.7 23.7 Austria -0.1 -0.1 0.2 334.1 
Belgium -0.8 -3.7 4.5 Belgium -3.3 -15.3 18.6 Belgium 0.0 -0.1 0.2 414.3 
Finland -1.0 -2.0 3.0 Finland -2.2 -4.4 6.6 Finland 0.0 0.0 0.1 219.9 
France -2.0 3.7 -1.7 France -45.7 84.5 -38.8 France -0.4 0.8 -0.4 2283.0 
Germany -0.5 -6.0 6.5 Germany -14.0 -168.2 182.2 Germany -0.1 -1.6 1.7 2803.6 
Greece -2.6 5.3 -2.7 Greece -6.3 12.9 -6.6 Greece -0.1 0.1 -0.1 244.1 
Ireland -4.7 -3.7 8.4 Ireland -8.2 -6.5 14.7 Ireland -0.1 -0.1 0.1 174.5 
Italy -0.2 3.0 -2.8 Italy -3.5 52.7 -49.2 Italy 0.0 0.5 -0.5 1756.8 
Netherlands -1.4 -9.8 11.2 Netherlands -9.4 -65.9 75.4 Netherlands -0.1 -0.6 0.7 672.9 
Portugal -2.3 3.4 -1.1 Portugal -4.2 6.1 -2.0 Portugal 0.0 0.1 0.0 180.7 
Spain -2.1 2.4 -0.3 Spain -25.8 29.5 -3.7 Spain -0.2 0.3 0.0 1230.3 
Other EMU* -1.8 -0.8 2.5 Other EMU* -4.0 -1.7 5.8 Other EMU* 0.0 0.0 0.0 229.9 
Average -1.6 -0.6 2.3 Sum -134.7 -92.0 226.7 Average -1.3 -0.87 2.2 10544.0 
* Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Source/Note: Stability Programmes, authors’ calculations: We use an extrapolation of the AMECO forecast as Luxembourg’s foreign balance.  
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Table 3: Simulated financial balances of Scenario 1: Euro area countries, 2014, given surplus countries realise their plans, but Euro area as a whole 
fails to improve its current account – adjustment is borne by deficit countries according to 2010 deficit shares. 
 
  
Balances as percentage of 
GDP   Balances in billions of Euro   Bal. as percentage of EMU GDP 
nom 
GDP 
  Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   
Austria -2.4 -4.7 7.1 Austria -8.0 -15.7 23.7 Austria -0.1 -0.1 0.2 334.1 
Belgium -0.8 -3.7 4.5 Belgium -3.3 -15.3 18.6 Belgium 0.0 -0.1 0.2 414.3 
Finland -1.0 -2.0 3.0 Finland -2.2 -4.4 6.6 Finland 0.0 0.0 0.1 219.9 
France -2.0 4.0 -2.0 France -45.7 92.4 -46.8 France -0.4 0.9 -0.4 2283.0 
Germany -0.5 -6.0 6.5 Germany -14.0 -168.2 182.2 Germany -0.1 -1.6 1.7 2803.6 
Greece -2.6 15.3 -12.7 Greece -6.3 37.2 -30.9 Greece -0.1 0.4 -0.3 244.1 
Ireland -4.7 0.9 3.8 Ireland -8.2 1.5 6.7 Ireland -0.1 0.0 0.1 174.5 
Italy -0.2 5.1 -4.9 Italy -3.5 89.3 -85.8 Italy 0.0 0.8 -0.8 1756.8 
Netherlands -1.4 -9.8 11.2 Netherlands -9.4 -65.9 75.4 Netherlands -0.1 -0.6 0.7 672.9 
Portugal -2.3 12.9 -10.6 Portugal -4.2 23.2 -19.1 Portugal 0.0 0.2 -0.2 180.7 
Spain -2.1 5.4 -3.3 Spain -25.8 65.9 -40.1 Spain -0.2 0.6 -0.4 1230.3 
Other EMU* -1.8 0.6 1.2 Other EMU* -4.0 1.3 2.7 Other EMU* 0.0 0.0 0.0 229.9 
Average -1.6 1.5 0.1 Sum -134.7 41.3 93.4 Average -1.3 0.4 0.9 10544.0 
* Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Note: The three balances may not sum to zero due to rounding.  
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Table 4: Simulated financial balances of scenario 2: Euro area countries, 2014, given surplus countries realise their plans, but Euro area as a whole 
fails to improve its current account – adjustment is borne by deficit countries according to 2014 deficit shares projected by the stability programmes.  
 
  
Balances as percentage of 
GDP   Balances in billions of Euro   
Balances as percentage of EMU 
GDP 
nom 
GDP 
  Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   
Austria -2.4 -4.7 7.1 Austria -8.0 -15.7 23.7 Austria -0.1 -0.1 0.2 334.1 
Belgium -0.8 -3.7 4.5 Belgium -3.3 -15.3 18.6 Belgium 0.0 -0.1 0.2 414.3 
Finland -1.0 -2.0 3.0 Finland -2.2 -4.4 6.6 Finland 0.0 0.0 0.1 219.9 
France -2.0 6.3 -4.3 France -45.7 144.4 -98.7 France -0.4 1.4 -0.9 2283.0 
Germany -0.5 -6.0 6.5 Germany -14.0 -168.2 182.2 Germany -0.1 -1.6 1.7 2803.6 
Greece -2.6 9.1 -6.5 Greece -6.3 22.1 -15.8 Greece -0.1 0.2 -0.1 244.1 
Ireland -4.7 -3.7 8.4 Ireland -8.2 -6.5 14.7 Ireland -0.1 -0.1 0.1 174.5 
Italy -0.2 5.1 -4.9 Italy -3.5 90.1 -86.6 Italy 0.0 0.9 -0.8 1756.8 
Netherlands -1.4 -9.8 11.2 Netherlands -9.4 -65.9 75.4 Netherlands -0.1 -0.6 0.7 672.9 
Portugal -2.3 5.8 -3.5 Portugal -4.2 10.5 -6.3 Portugal 0.0 0.1 -0.1 180.7 
Spain -2.1 4.1 -2.0 Spain -25.8 50.5 -24.6 Spain -0.2 0.5 -0.2 1230.3 
Other EMU* -1.8 -0.1 1.9 Other EMU* -4.0 -0.3 4.3 Other EMU* 0.0 0.0 0.0 229.9 
Average -1.6 0.4 1.2 Sum -134.7 41.3 93.4 Sum -1.3 0.4 0.9 10544.0 
* Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Note: The three balances may not sum to zero due to rounding.  
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Table 5: Simulated Financial balances of Scenario 3: Euro area countries, 2014, given symmetric rebalancing (maximal 2 per cent of GDP current 
account deficits) but Euro area as a whole fails to improve its current account. 
 
  
Balances as percentage of 
GDP   Balances in billions of Euro   Bal. as percentage of EMU GDP 
nom 
GDP 
  Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   Public Foreign Private   
Austria -2.4 -0.9 3.3 Austria -8.0 -3.1 11.2 Austria -0.1 0.0 0.1 334.1 
Belgium -0.8 -0.8 1.6 Belgium -3.3 -3.3 6.6 Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.1 414.3 
Finland -1.0 -0.8 1.8 Finland -2.2 -1.7 3.9 Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 219.9 
France -2.0 2.0 0.0 France -45.7 45.7 0.0 France -0.4 0.4 0.0 2283.0 
Germany -0.5 -1.6 2.1 Germany -14.0 -44.3 58.3 Germany -0.1 -0.4 0.6 2803.6 
Greece -2.6 2.0 0.6 Greece -6.3 4.9 1.5 Greece -0.1 0.0 0.0 244.1 
Ireland -4.7 -3.7 8.4 Ireland -8.2 -6.5 14.7 Ireland -0.1 -0.1 0.1 174.5 
Italy -0.2 2.0 -1.8 Italy -3.5 35.1 -31.6 Italy 0.0 0.3 -0.3 1756.8 
Netherlands -1.4 -2.1 3.5 Netherlands -9.4 -14.0 23.4 Netherlands -0.1 -0.1 0.2 672.9 
Portugal -2.3 2.0 0.3 Portugal -4.2 3.6 0.5 Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 180.7 
Spain -2.1 2.0 0.1 Spain -25.8 24.6 1.2 Spain -0.2 0.2 0.0 1230.3 
Other EMU* -1.8 0.1 1.6 Other EMU* -4.0 0.3 3.8 Other EMU* 0.0 0.0 0.0 229.9 
Average -1.6 0.2 1.4 Sum -134.7 41.3 93.4 Sum -1.3 0.4 0.9 10544.0 
* Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Note: The three balances may not sum to zero due to rounding.  
 
 
